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Abstract 
This study employs the instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression 
approach for the data for 121 countries to explore the impact of a country’s political 
environment on its level of corruption. The study provides strong evidence that a higher 
degree of rule of law, press freedom, readiness and capacity to handle e-governance practices, 
and urbanization are associated with a lower level of public sector corruption across all 121 
countries. The colonial dummies and having a presidential government are found to be valid 
instruments for rule of law in addressing the issue of endogeniety embedded in it. Further, to 
a certain degree, landlocked countries are relatively more corrupt than costal countries. 
Finally, policy implications are discussed based on the findings of the study.   
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1. Introduction 
In general, public sector corruption means misusing entrusted authority or public 
office for private benefits or personal gains. Yet, the meaning of corruption is contextual and 
has been articulated in different nation state vernaculars accordingly. For instance, in Italian, 
corruption is called spintarella, which means “a little push”, in Greek, fakelaki, “a little 
envelope”, in French, pot-de-vin, “a glass of wine”, and in Spanish, mordida “a bite”. 
Likewise, in Slovak, corruption is called pod stolom, meaning “under the table”, in Korean, 
noemul, “giving goods in secret”, and in Japanese, kuroi kiri, “black mist”. Hence, the term 
corruption carries different meanings in different contexts with differing ways of application, 
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however, sharing the commonality that corruption is a secret act of dishonesty for private 
interest.  Senior (2006), defines corruption as an action to secretly provide a good or a service 
to a third party, so that he or she can influence certain actions, which benefit the corrupt, a 
third party, or both in which the corrupt agent has authority.  
Today, corruption is all too prevalent, not only in developing countries, but also in the 
EU (Senior, 2006). Corruption inflicts various adverse impacts on economic, social, and 
political systems of a country.  Economists have clearly shown how economic growth of a 
country can be adversely affected by corruption: corruption increases transaction costs and 
reduces incentives for investment, thereby leading to shrink the growth rate of an economy. It 
also affects income growth, particularly of the poor, redistributing wealth away from the poor 
to the better-off and employees of government. This gives rise to increased income inequality 
in a country (see Gupta Davoodi and Alsonso-Terme, 1998; Fisman and Svensson, 2000; 
Senior, 2006). Moreover, corruption imposes a negative impact on tax revenue of a country. 
As Ghura (1998) argues, an increase in the level of public sector corruption accompanies a 
lowering of the tax-revenue-GDP ratio. Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) computed that one-point 
increase in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is associated with 2.7 percentage point 
decline in tax-GDP ratio. Transparency international (2010) points out that public sector 
corruption erodes the tax revenue base in the long-run, corrodes the tax morality of taxpayers, 
and distorts tax structures, leading to increase the size of unofficial economy of countries. 
Public sector corruption can, therefore, causes critical damage to the smooth functioning of 
an economy.  
Further, as argued by Seligson (2002), corruption generates political costs. On the 
basis of 9,000 observations from four Latin American countries, Seligson contends that 
corruption erodes belief of participants in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust, 
questioning the legitimacy of the system. Apart from economic and political costs, corruption 
involves social and moral costs, meaning that social variables are negatively impacted by 
corruption. For instance, Dreher and Hezfeld (2005) computed negative impacts of corruption 
on social variables like life expectancy and school enrollment using data from 71 countries. 
In sum, as Senior (2006) points out, corruption can cause serious impediment to the 
development of a market economy and a free society.  
Determinants of corruption are numerous and multifaceted, thus making any scientific 
study of its causes a difficult task. Yet, the rich literature available on the causes of corruption 
notes that economic, cultural, political, sociological, psychological, and geographical factors 
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play a major role in determining the level of corruption, whereas Ata and Arvas (2011) 
considering the mean values of data for 25 European countries during 2004 through 2007 
have concluded that higher GDP per capita, lower inflation rates, and lower income disparity 
reduce the perception of corruption. However, they’ve found that corruption levels are not 
affected by rates of economic growth.  Several studies have pointed out that economic factors 
are more important than non-economic factors in reducing corruption. For instance, on the 
basis of 41 developing countries, Shabbir and Anwar (2007) emphasize that to curb 
corruption, governments need to focus on economic freedom, globalization, and distribution 
of income and wealth, while non-economic factors consisting of press-freedom, democracy, 
and people’s religious beliefs do not play a role in corruption. Conversely, some other studies 
have noted that social factors including population growth rate, literacy rate, and religious 
beliefs do play a role in deciding the level of public sector corruption. For instance, Akano et 
al (2013) using vector error-correction models for Nigeria have shown the role of population 
growth rate and literacy rate in determining corruption, while Treisman (2000) has found that 
people’s Protestant traditions are a significant determinant of curtailing corruption.  
Regarding political factors of corruption, Ali and Isse (2003) contend that higher 
judicial efficiency and smaller governments are associated with lower levels of corruption in 
countries. However, Kotera et al (2010) argue that the size of government does not matter in 
determining the level of corruption as long as the level of democracy remains sufficiently 
high. Therefore, as part of democracy, rule of law has a bigger role to be played in achieving 
lower levels of corruption (Salih, 2013). Using a non-linear model to show the democracy-
corruption link, Sung (2004) has clearly proven the fact that democratic accomplishments 
reduce the degree of political corruption in a country. Also, some studies have used 
instrumental variable regressions to consistently show the link between fiscal decentralization 
and degree of corruption, arguing that fiscal decentralization in public expenditure and 
taxation leads to reduced corruption levels (for instance see Fisman and Gatti, 2000; Altunbas 
and Thornton, 2012). Conversely, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2007) have found no evidence to 
support fiscal decentralization as a factor of political corruption. 
Finally, studies have tested technology related variables to see if there is any link 
between corruption and technology. For instance, Pathak et al (2009) presenting a Fijian case 
have emphasized that IT-based service delivery processes contribute to curbing public sector 
corruption. Also, Murillo (2013) using six-year panel data for 208 countries has shown that 
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using internet and government web portals reduces the negative perceptions towards public 
sector corruption.  
Within this context, this study is primarily aimed at analyzing the role of political 
environment in determining the level of public sector corruption in 121 countries, both 
developed and developing. The ‘traditional elements’ of political environment, i.e., the 
elements that have been tested in previous studies, comprise rule of law, press freedom, 
nature of legislature, being a federal or unitary state, size of government, and openness of 
markets. In addition to testing these traditional elements,  more importantly, this study will be 
examining the role of e-governance practices and military involvement in politics, two 
‘potential elements’ of political environment that have not been tested before, in curbing 
corruption. Also, in this study we have used several control variables, namely GDP per-
capita, Gini index, and religious beliefs, three variables that have been previously used 
though, and the rate of urbanization and being a landlocked country, two potential control 
variables  that have not been used in previous studies and thus unique to this study.  
Corroborating the findings of previous research, our analyses show that ensuring rule 
of law and press freedom reduces public sector corruption significantly. Yet, more 
importantly, for the first time in corruption literature our study shows that e-governance 
practices can play a significant role in reducing public sector corruption, thus enriching the 
existing body of knowledge. Based on the estimates of control variables, it was found that 
countries with higher urbanization rates are less corrupt and vice versa. Further, to a certain 
degree this study proves that landlocked countries are more corrupt than coastal countries. 
Since this study is based on 121 countries consisting of both developed and developing 
countries, the findings are generalized to both contexts, the developed and developing. The 
rest of the paper is organized in the order that section two elaborates research methodology 
employed to realize the set objectives, while section three is devoted to elaborate the data and 
their summary statistics. The empirical results and main findings are discussed in section 
four, while section five concludes the study together with policy implications.      
       
2. Research Method 
We consider the level of public sector corruption of a country as a function of its 
political environment. As noted above, a wide range of variables are taken into account to 
capture the impact of political environment on corruption including rule of law, nature of 
legislature, being a federal or unitary state, press freedom, size of government, openness of 
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markets, readiness for e-governance practices, and military in politics. The impact of the 
factors external to the political environment is controlled by including an array of variables in 
estimating the model. They include a country’s main religion, being a landlocked country, 
urbanization, per capita GDP, and income distribution among people.  
 
Addressing Endogeniety  
Endogeniety might be an issue when using rule of law as an explanatory variable in 
the corruption equation due to reverse causation and measurement errors. Public sector 
corruption can become a serious issue threatening the rule of law of a country. According to 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2013), any 
form of corruption including ministers abusing their power, police officials taking bribes, 
elections being “bought”, crooked judges, money laundering, parliamentarians claiming false 
expenses, and illegal lobbying weaken public institutions, undermining the rule law of the 
member states of the Council. Fedotov (2012) points out that rule of law cannot be 
established and ensured where bribery and corruption are prevalent due to the fact that public 
sector corruption shuns fair tendering and recruitment processes.  
Further, there are several pitfalls in measuring complex social phenomena, such as 
rule of law. Ginsburg (2011) notes that quantifying rule of law is challenging resulting from 
the associated issues of conceptualization and measurement. Regarding the concepts of social 
sciences, it is relatively more difficult to formulate a concept by allowing a certain degree of 
abstraction. Put differently, in formulating social science concepts, the formulator should be 
clear enough as to what is being measured. Finally, poor conceptualization leads to bad 
quantification with measurement errors. This study uses World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators’ Rule of Law Index, which is, however, subject to the same weakness discussed 
above. Ginsburg (2011) contends that this index aggregates too many discrete elements into a 
single concept. In computing the rule of law index, the World Bank has included the 
procedural elements as well as the substantive concepts, whereas procedural elements are 
related to the process of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, while substantive 
concepts are security of individuals and freedom from crime. These two categories of 
elements may not be combined together to formulate a single index. 
 Therefore, in this study the issue of endogeniety has been addressed using 
instrumental variables (IVs) and we use instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-
2SLS) approach to estimate the coefficients. As instrumental variables, we use three dummy 
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variables that indicate whether a country was a British colony or a Spanish colony and 
currently a presidential democracy. There is likelihood that these three variables are 
indirectly related to the level of public sector corruption through rule of law Thus, the main 
regression model that we are interested in is as follows: 
 
 
 
However, rule of law that is included in the vector of political environment is 
estimated by employing the dummy variables for former British colony, Spanish colony, and 
current presidential government as instruments to address the issue of endogeniety.  As 
literature contends, colonial history affects the level of rule of law in a country (for instance 
see La Porta, 1998; Licht, 2003; and Croix and Delevallade, 2011). Cameron et al (2006) 
argue that the problems of presidential governments are associated with rule of law. They 
clearly prove that the rule of law is weak in most presidential democracies when compared 
with parliamentary governments.  
   
(2)                    ._Pr
...____
3
210
µpi
pipipi
++
+++=
ablesenous_variOther_exogpi4Govtesidential
ColonySpanishColonyBritishLawofRule
 
 
The predicted values of the variable “Rule of Law” is included in the equation (1) as a 
component of political environment.  Also, ε and µ are structural error terms of the equation 
(1) and (2), respectively.  
The results of the test for over-identifying restrictions and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test for endogeniety are reported in the last four rows of Table 03. The Wooldridge’s score 
tests of over-identifying restrictions are not statistically significant even at 10 percent error 
level across three models estimated using different corruption indices as the dependent 
variable. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. It further 
says the instrumental variables: two colonial dummies and presidential government dummy 
are correlated with the rule of law and uncorrelated with the structural error term. Having 
ensured that the instrumental variables are satisfactory, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is 
conducted to check the endogeniety of the variable, rule of law.  The null hypothesis that the 
regressors are exogenous is rejected at one percent error level for the second model, where 
the dependent variable is World Governance Indicators-Corruption Index (WGI) and 10 
( ) (1)               _ 0 εβ +++= trols)(Other_ConβtenvironmenPolitical_β 21LevelCorruption
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percent error level for the first and the third models, where the dependent variables are 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and International Country Risk Guide-Corruption Index 
(ICRG), respectively. Therefore, it is clear that the rule of law is an endogenous regressor and 
that we need to employ instrumental variable approach instead of OLS approach. 
 
Robustness Check 
     In order to secure robustness of the findings, OLS and IV-2SLS models are 
estimated by using three different measurements of public sector corruption, namely CPI, 
WGI, and ICRG. The source and the range of each index are presented in Table 01. These 
three corruption indices have been compiled by the Transparency International, the World 
Bank, and the Political Risk Services (PRS) group, respectively. Though their ranges are 
different, in all three indices, higher index values indicate lower levels of corruption and vice 
versa. This is a commonly accepted method of checking the robustness of the findings of 
corruption-related research (for instance see Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 
2007; Kotera et al, 2010).  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
Public Sector Corruption 
The data used are based on 2012 and as mentioned above, the number of countries is 
121 (n=121). The study uses three indices to account for public sector corruption and the 
summary statistics of variables are provided in Table 02. 
Accordingly, based on CPI and ICRG, North Korea has been identified as the most 
corrupt, whereas based on WGI and ICRG, Libya has been ranked as the most corrupt in the 
world. On the other hand, according to all three indices, Denmark has been identified as the 
cleanest in the world. Finland, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden are also among the 
cleanest countries. Figure 01 positions all 121 countries on a CPI-ICRG plane.  
Figure 01 shows that as the cleanest countries, Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, 
Sweden, and Norway are well above the mean index values, while North Korea, Libya, 
Zimbabwe, Haiti, and Venezuela as the most corrupt countries are far below the mean index 
values. Though Figure 01 generally depicts a positive correlation between CPI and ICRG, 
countries are rather sparsely scattered on the graph, showing a variation in the perception of 
corruption reflected by the two indices. For instance, Indonesia and Bangladesh are located 
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above ICRG-average, but below CPI-average. Likewise, Lithuania, Costa-Rica, Turkey, and 
Czech Republic are located above mean-CPI scores, but below mean-ICRG scores.     
 
Political Environment 
The data capturing the nature of each country’s legislature include first, whether the 
legislature is unicameral or bicameral and second, women’s participation in legislature. The 
data on whether it is a unicameral or bicameral state is recorded as a dummy variable by 
obtaining information from the World Fact Book by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of 
the United States. Unicameral is a type of legislature with single house in the legislative 
council, while bicameral legislative council consists of two houses: lower house and upper 
house.  As Table 02 illustrates, approximately 55.4 percent of the countries have unicameral 
legislatures. The data on women’s participation in legislature were from Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (IPU), which is the international organization of parliaments. The IPU reports 
percentage figures of female members in legislature for each country. If the legislature is 
bicameral, women’s participation in both lower and upper houses is reported separately. 
However, this study uses women’s participation in legislature in each country as a whole. On 
average, in the selected 121 countries, 19 percent of the members in the legislature are 
women, however, the percentage figures varying vastly across countries. In the legislative 
councils of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, there is no women’s representation, while Sweden 
records the highest women’s representation in legislature. Moreover, the data on whether a 
country is federal or unitary were also obtained from the CIA World Fact Book. Accordingly, 
of the sample approximately 15 percent of the countries are federal states.    
The data on press freedom were obtained from the World Press Freedom Index 
annually published by Reporters without Boarders, a consultancy non-profit organization of 
the UN and UNESCO. The World Press Freedom Index captures the level of freedom 
enjoyed by both media personnel and media organizations in each country. It also measures 
the extent to which the authorities work towards assuring freedom of information. The index 
ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 being the best possible score, while 100 being the worst possible. 
In order to make the direction of all study variables consistent and easier to interpret, we used 
inverse of the world press freedom index. Therefore, in this study higher values reflect 
relatively greater levels of press freedom and vise versa. As depicted in Table 02, North 
Korea and Finland were the extremes with North Korea enjoying the least press freedom, 
while Finland the highest press freedom.  
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The E-Government Development Index is a composite indicator which measures the 
extent to which authorities are ready and capable enough in employing information and 
communication technology (ICT) in delivering public services. The data were obtained from 
the E-Government Development Survey, 2012 conducted by the UN. The index ranges from 
zero to one, where zero indicates the least readiness and capability towards e-government 
applications while one indicates the highest readiness and capability. On average, the 
countries recorded 0.55 on e-government index, however, the index value varying across 
countries with a standard deviation of approximately 0.2. Guinea and Libya recorded the 
lowest readiness and capability in e-government practices while Netherlands the highest 
readiness and capability.   
The data on limited government and open markets are from 2012-Index of Economic 
Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. These indices 
vary from zero to 100 with higher values signaling relatively stronger performance and vice 
versa. 
The data on limited government captures the extent to which individuals and 
businesses are free from government control in using their income and wealth for own ends, 
and the cost of excessive government in terms of public expenditure. Hence, the Limited 
Government Index is the arithmetic mean of the indices, Fiscal Freedom Index and 
Government Spending Index. In terms of limited government index, North Korea reported the 
lowest performance, while Paraguay the highest. The Open Market Index is calculated by 
taking the simple mean of the indices, Trade Freedom, Investment Freedom, and Financial 
Freedom Index. Trade freedom is an economy’s level of openness to international trade while 
investment freedom is the level of freedom to capitalize entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Financial freedom is the level of openness, transparency, accessibility, and fairness of a 
country’s financial system. In terms of open market index, North Korea and Hong Kong 
reported the lowest and highest scores, respectively.   
The data on rule of law were obtained from the World Bank. These data capture the 
level of confidence of agents in the rules of society, quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts. This index varies from -2.5 to +2.5 with higher positive 
values indicating higher levels of government performance with regard to rule of law and 
vice versa. On the index, the countries scored 0.085 on average, however, with significant 
variations across countries with a standard deviation of one. However, Venezuela and 
Norway were the weakest and strongest in ensuring rule of law, respectively.  
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Furthermore, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by the Political Risk Service 
(PRS) provides data on military in politics as an index ranging from zero to six, where higher 
values reflect lower levels of political militarization of countries and vice versa. The average 
index value was 4.05. However, Haiti was recorded to be having the highest military 
intervention in politics while the OECD countries accounted for in the study sample together 
with Costa-Rica, Namibia, Jamaica, and Malta were recorded to be enjoying the least military 
intervention in politics.  
 
Baseline Controls and Instruments 
 As highlighted above, this study uses a wide range of control variables, including 
urbanization rate, being a landlocked country, Gini index, per capita income, and the major 
religion of the selected countries. It should be noted that data for all these variables are from 
CIA World Factbook. The urbanization rate measures the percentage change in a country’s 
urban population over a period of one year. On average, urban population is on the increase at 
a rate of 1.8 percent. Burkina-Faso reported the highest urbanization rate in 2012. On the 
contrary, Lithuania recorded a decrease in the size of urban population being the country with 
the lowest rate of urbanization. Regarding income distribution, we use the inverse of Gini 
coefficient to account for the distribution of income among people. In 2012, South Africa and 
Sweden reported the highest and lowest income disparity, respectively. In terms of per capita 
income, Zimbabwe and Qatar reported the worst and best performance, respectively.  
In terms of instrumental variables, of the sample 27.3 percent are former British colonies, 
14.9 percent are former Spanish colonies, while 47.1 percent have presidential governments.    
Table 02 presents summary statistics for these instrumental variables.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Rule of Law and Free Press 
Table 03 presents key results of the study: first, it shows OLS estimates for three 
regression equations with three different corruption indices for the dependent variable; and 
second, it reports IV-2SLS estimates. Since IV-2SLS estimates are more consistent than OLS 
estimates due to the issue of endogeniety, our interpretations are primarily based on IV-2SLS 
estimates. The coefficient of determination (R-squared value) is satisfactorily high across all 
the models. Referring to IV-2SLS models, for instance, the variation of the chosen 
explanatory variables explain 92.5 percent of the variation of the level of corruption 
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measured in terms of CPI. As indices of corruption, the values reported on WGI and ICRG 
are 92.4 and 87.3 percent, respectively.    
 According to Table 03, the coefficients for rule of law are statistically significant in 
both the OLS and IV-2SLS results confirming that a country’s rule of law is a main 
determinant of its public sector corruption. Further, the positive sign of the coefficients 
indicates that a higher degree of rule of law leads to higher corruption indices, thus signaling 
lower corruption levels in the countries. In other words, the countries whose agents are more 
confident in the rule of society, quality of contracts, property rights, the police, and courts are 
less corrupt and vice versa. Akano and Ogunseye (2013) argue that a country’s rule of law 
promoted by an independent judiciary and police services would build the confidence level of 
its citizenry in established institutions lowering the likelihood of public sector corruption. 
These findings of Akano and Ogunseye are consistent with those of Leite and Weidmann 
(1999), Fisman and Gatti (2000), and Ali and Isse (2003). Salih (2013) in his estimations uses 
rule of law as a proxy for the judiciary system and proves that a better judiciary system 
results in lower probability of perceived corruption. Likewise, using a dynamic general 
equilibrium model, Croix and Delavallade (2011) estimate that a weak legal system favours 
public sector corruption.  
Resultantly, it is evident that the link between rule of law and corruption is adequately 
documented. However, this study solves the issue of endogeneity associated with rule of law 
by employing suitable instrumental variables, namely the legal origin of countries and the 
fact that whether a country is having a presidential government functions properly.  
 The coefficients for press freedom are statistically significant and positive even at one 
percent error level. This clearly indicates that greater freedom of the press is associated with 
less public sector corruption. This finding is robust across all six models and also consistent 
with the findings of many studies (for instance see Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Shen and 
Williamson, 2005; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006; Chaudhry and Glulam, 2007; Altunbas and 
Thornton, 2011).  
 
E-Governance 
In the context of contemporary public sector, ICT plays a significant role in delivering 
a country’s public services to its citizenry. Basically, the objective of the ICT based service 
system - a core of e-governance - is to integrate economic, social, and environmental goals 
through an institutional inter-linkage, where e-governance initiatives are expected to bring 
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about greater efficiency, better service delivery, and higher level of citizen participation. 
Presenting a case of Fiji, Pathak et al (2009) show that ICT-enabled service delivery can 
effectively curb public sector corruption. According to their calculations, the correlation 
coefficient between IT initiatives and corruption reduction is +0.995, which is almost a 
positive perfect correlation. Further, drawing on data for 208 countries together with 
instrumental variable regressions, Murillo (2013) notes that web presence of the government 
reduces the perception of public sector corruption. As a result, Murillo recommends 
international assistance for web-based service delivery initiatives of the government sector.  
This paper’s main contribution to corruption literature is that we incorporate the 
whole idea of e-governance through e-governance development index used as an explanatory 
variable in the analyses. Online public service delivery is one of the key components of e-
governance. However, the degree of online service delivery through means, such as national 
central portals, e-services portals and e-participation portals and the websites of ministries 
differ from country to country in terms of their features, content, and the level of services 
offered. Accordingly, without limiting to government web presence, the e-governance 
development index encompasses the nature of telecommunication infrastructure in terms of 
the variables, such as number of internet users, mobile subscribers, fixed broadband facilities 
and so forth. Moreover, this index recognizes the importance of human capital in successfully 
implementing a system of e-governance in a country. Therefore, the e-governance index 
considers adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross 
enrollment ratio to account for human development.   
Our analyses clearly show that e-governance reduces the level of public sector 
corruption. As shown in Table 03, the coefficients for e-governance are positive and 
statistically significant across all six models. However, the results are stronger in IV- 2SLS 
models, which are also considered to be more consistent estimates. For instance, as Table 03 
demonstrates, the coefficients are significant at five percent error level in IV-2SLS estimates 
as well as 10 percent error level in the majority of OLS estimates. According to IV-2SLS 
results, one unit increase in e-governance development index will increase CPI by 15.4, WGI 
by 0.95, and ICRG by 1.26 units.       
 
Results reflected from Baseline Controls 
 The coefficients for the variable urbanization are statistically significant and positive 
across all three IV-2SLS models, being a robust determinant of corruption. According to the 
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results, the countries with higher rates of urbanization are less corrupt. It is likely that with 
urbanization people become more and more aware of public sector corruption and its nature. 
Billger and Goel (2009) point out that the concentration of people in urban areas gives way 
for room for frequent interaction between potential rent-seekers and rent-payers. This 
connotes that in rural areas people are relatively less aware of and exposed to public sector 
institutions and service delivery processes and, therefore, more likely to be potential rent-
payers. Similarly, using cross-country data for 100 countries, Goel and Nelson (2011) argue 
that a higher urbanization rate is more likely to reduce the level of public sector corruption, 
which this study also corroborates based on consistent IV-2SLS estimates for the selected 
121 countries.  
 Moreover, as shown in Table 03, countries with higher per capita income levels are 
less corrupt in terms of WGI though per capita income is not a robust determinant of 
corruption. Literature documents that a higher GDP per capita leads to a lower degree of 
corruption perception (for instance see Kotera et al, 2010; Ata and Arvas, 2011; Altunbas and 
Thornton, 2012; Salih, 2013). However, our results show that GDP per capita plays a 
relatively minor role in reducing the perception of public sector corruption. Furthermore, it 
was interesting to note that landlocked countries are more corrupt than coastal countries. 
Table 03 shows that the coefficient for “landlocked dummy” is negative and significant only 
when ICRG is used as the dependent variable. Generally, landlocked developing countries are 
less involved in international trade when compared with coastal countries due to longer 
transportation time to reach transit countries and complex local custom procedures and 
services (Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program, 2011). This complexity is likely to result 
in higher levels of public sector corruption in these countries. Yet, being a landlocked country 
was not found a robust determinant of corruption because it does not generate a significant 
impact on corruption measured in terms of both CPI and WGI.  
It was also evident from our analyses that being a unicameral legislature and its rate 
of women’s participation, being a federal state, size of government, and the openness of 
markets do not have an impact on the perception of public sector corruption.  Finally, it was 
noted that the main religion of countries, military in politics, and income distribution were 
also not significant determinants of corruption in the public sector.  
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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations        
 This study contributes to the existing body of corruption literature as it proposes 
suitable instrumental variables to evaluate the impact of rule of law on public sector 
corruption having recognized the issue of endogeniety. Accordingly, being a former British 
colony or a Spanish colony together with being a presidential government at present were 
found to be satisfactory IVs for rule of law. This study did find that rule of law and freedom 
of press as significant determinants of public sector corruption. Therefore, strengthening rule 
of law by building people’s confidence in the rule of society, improving quality of contracts, 
ensuring property rights, and making the police and courts independent is recommended as a 
key policy measure to curb corruption in public sector. It is also recommended that ensuring 
press freedom as a policy measure can successfully combat public sector corruption.  
 Further, the study found strong evidence to support the association between e-
governance practices and the perception of public sector corruption. Therefore, we propose e-
governance practices as effective policy tools for reducing corruption. Increasing the level of 
government web presence, promoting ICT-enabled public services, and improving related 
human capital can be listed as some of these policy measures. 
 Further, based on the finding that increased urbanization is accompanied by decreased 
public sector corruption, policies that promote urbanization can be suggested as indirect 
measures to fight corruption. Also, as the analyses show that landlocked countries are more 
corrupt, we propose that such countries need special attention when formulating global 
policies to combat public sector corruption.  
 By challenging traditional literature on corruption, we showed that being a unicameral 
legislature, women’s participation in legislature, being a federal state, size of public sector, 
openness of markets, military in politics, and the main religion of countries do not have 
significant impacts on corruption. Likewise, we do not prove that level of corruption is 
affected by income distribution measured in terms of Gini index. However, this study was 
based on cross-sectional data for 121 countries for the year 2012. Therefore, it does not 
account for the dynamics of public sector corruption in countries. Future research is expected 
to employ more comprehensive panel data to account for the dynamics and structural changes 
in level of public sector corruption in countries.  
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Table 01: Alternative indices for the level of public sector corruption 
Corruption Index Compiler Range 
Very clean  Highly corrupt 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Transparency International, Berlin 10 0 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)-Corruption 
Index  
The Political Risk Services (PRS) Group, 
New York  
6 0 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)-
Corruption control  
The World Bank, Washington D.C. 2.5 -2.5 
Source: Transparency International, 2012, The PRS Group, 2012, The World Bank, 2012 
 
Table 02: Summary statistics  
 N Mean SD    Minimum     Maximum 
Corruption Indices 
CPI 121 46.347 19.852 8.000 [N. Korea] 90.000 [Denmark, Finland, New Zealand] 
WGI 121 0.067 1.051 -1.400 [Libya] 2.390 [Denmark] 
ICRG 121 2.665 1.224 1.000 [Haiti, N. Korea, Libya, 
Venezuela, Zimbabwe]   
5.500 [Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden] 
Political Environment 
Rule of law 121 0.085 1.000 -1.690 [Venezuela] 1.950 [Norway] 
Unicameral legislature 121 0.554 0.499 0  1  
Press freedom index (inv) 121 0.047 0.032 0.012 [N. Korea] 0.157 [Finland] 
E-government index 121 0.546 0.208 0.000 [Guinea, Libya] 0.913 [Netherlands] 
Limited government 121 67.943 17.168 2.500 [N. Korea] 92.700 [Paraguay] 
Open markets 121 62.529 16.025 0.000 [N. Korea] 90.000 [Hong Kong] 
Federal state 121 0.149 0.357 0  1  
Women in legislature 121 18.973 10.611 0.000 [Qatar, Saudi Arabia]  44.699 [Sweden] 
Military in politics 121 4.050 1.563 0.000 [Haiti] 6.000 [OECD members, Costa-Rica, 
Namibia, Jamaica, Malta]  
Baseline Controls 
Urbanization rate 121 1.820 1.363 -0.500 [Lithuania] 6.200 [Burkina Faso] 
Landlocked dummy 121 0.165 0.373 0  1  
Gini index (inv) 121 0.027 0.006 0.016 [South Africa] 0.043 [Sweden] 
Log (Per capita income) 121 9.222 1.222 6.215 [Zimbabwe] 11.541 [Qatar] 
Major religion (Islam) 121 0.248 0.434 0  1  
Major religion 
(Christianity) 
121 0.488 0.502 0  1  
Instrumental Variables for the Rule of Law 
Former British colony 121 0.273 0.447 0  1  
Former Spanish colony 121 0.149 0.358 0  1  
Presidential government 121 0.471 0.501 0  1  
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 03: Model estimation results 
 OLS estimation Instrumental Variable [2SLS] estimation 
CPI WGI ICRG CPI WGI ICRG 
Political Environment 
Rule of law 18.4113*** 0.9801*** 1.1516*** 12.5671*** 0.5538*** 0.6987** 
 (1.3788) (0.0655) (0.1043) (3.6417) (0.1997) (0.2944) 
Unicameral legislature 0.5176 0.0129 -0.0399 -0.3173 -0.0479 -0.1046 
 (1.0856) (0.0528) (0.0916) (1.3108) (0.0726) (0.1113) 
Press freedom index (inv) 93.7611*** 4.8686*** 6.3508*** 122.8796*** 6.9928*** 8.6070*** 
 (24.3246) (1.1132) (1.8267) (35.5009) (1.8223) (2.4966) 
E-government index 10.5265* 0.5952** 0.8862* 15.4011** 0.9508** 1.2638** 
 (5.9096) (0.2876) (0.5098) (6.9720) (0.3961) (0.6062) 
Limited government 0.0834 0.0023 0.0009 0.0339 -0.0012 -0.0029 
 (0.0541) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0616) (0.0050) (0.0046) 
Open markets -0.0407 -0.0042 -0.0067 0.0797 0.0046 -0.0026 
 (0.0633) (0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0922) (0.0050) (0.0074) 
Federal states 1.7765 0.0408 0.0712 2.2303 0.0739 0.1063 
 (1.5918) (0.0781) (0.1162) (1.6438) (0.0869) (0.1216) 
Women in Legislature 0.0327 0.0019 0.0049 0.0320 0.0020 0.0048 
 (0.0613) (0.0023) (0.0050) (0.0581) (0.0029) (0.0046) 
Military in politics -0.8888* -0.0635*** -0.0998** -0.2107 -0.0140 -0.0472 
 (0.4576) (0.0229) (0.0407) (0.4986) (0.0279) (0.0485) 
Baseline Controls 
Urbanization rate 0.8087 0.0421 0.0772 1.8322*** 0.1168*** 0.1565** 
 (0.6609) (0.0347) (0.0571) (0.6892) (0.0391) (0.0698) 
Landlocked dummy -1.6136 -0.0705 -0.2745** -1.5441 -0.0654 -0.2692** 
 (1.8981) (0.0851) (0.1214) (1.8293) (0.0839) (0.1173) 
Gini index (inv) -131.2268 -8.0884 4.7507 -142.4855 -8.9097 3.8784 
 (119.7964) (4.9889) (9.0631) (124.0619) (5.9604) (9.1776) 
Log (Per capita income) -0.1395 0.0175 -0.0953 1.5525 0.1409* 0.0357 
 (1.1054) (0.0487) (0.0921) (1.4041) (0.0755) (0.1303) 
Major religion (Islam) 0.5998 0.0152 0.0520 -0.6106 -0.0730 -0.0417 
 (1.4026) (0.0735) (0.1513) (1.6238) (0.1004) (0.1751) 
Major religion (Christianity) -0.0046 0.0119 0.0265 -1.9140 -0.1273 -0.1214 
 (1.5885) (0.0713) (0.1246) (1.7713) (0.0981) (0.1645) 
Constant 37.3704*** -0.2813 3.0915*** 11.3989 -2.1759** 1.0791 
 (10.0124) (0.4837) (0.7468) (16.1085) (0.8877) (1.4526) 
       
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.937 0.948 0.892 0.925 0.924 0.873 
Wooldridge’s test  statistics (P-value)    1.7467 1.6600 1.2700 
    (0.4175) (0.4360) (0.5299) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (P-value)    3.5538 7.5023 3.3554 
    (0.0594) (0.0062) (0.0670) 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. Also, ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
error levels, respectively.  
Source: Own calculations  
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Figure 01: The level of public sector corruption in the selected countries based on CPI and ICRG, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Transparency International, 2012 and the PRS Group, 2012 
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